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I. INTRODUCTION
Source licensing legislation, first introduced in Congress in
19851 and re-introduced in 1987,2 proposed dramatic changes in
the manner in which performing rights for the copyrighted music
portions of syndicated television programs are licensed. While
these bills died in committee after vigorous opposition from music
publishing and copyright advocacy groups, broadcasters can be ex-
pected to continue to press for source licensing. Presently, local
broadcasters must acquire music performing rights before broad-
casting syndicated programs or they risk infringing the copyrighted
musical compositions synchronized with the visual images in the
programs.3 The program producer conveys to its licensees all rights
1. H.R. 3521, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985); S. 1980, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985). Both
bills proposed to amend the Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-914 (1982 & Supp. V
1987), to require producers of television programs to convey the right to perform publicly
the music accompanying the program along with all other rights. Presently, music perform-
ing rights must be acquired by the broadcaster separately. See infra text accompanying note
3. However, both the House bill and the Senate bill died in committee. Comment, H.R. 1195
Source Licensing: A Legislative Swan Song to the Blanket License, 67 OR. L. REV. 735, 757
(1988).
2. Bills were introduced in both the Senate, S. 698, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987), and
the House, H.R. 1195, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987). According to the Senate version, the
bill's purpose is "[tio amend title 17, United States Code, to prohibit the conveyance of the
right to perform publicly syndicated television programs without conveying the right to per-
form accompanying music." S. 698, supra. The two bills were similar, but the House version
included a provision creating a collective bargaining right in composers. See infra notes 102-
109 and accompanying text.
3. 17 U.S.C. § 108(4) (1982) (provides for an exclusive right to "perform the copy-
righted work publicly").
To "perform" a work means to recite, render, play, dance, or act it, either di-
rectly or by means of any device or process or, in the case of a motion picture or
other audiovisual work, to show its images in any sequence or to make the
sounds accompanying it audible."
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to broadcast the dramatic performances and literary property em-
bodied in its programs, except the music performing right, which
the broadcaster must acquire separately.
Music performing rights usually are acquired pursuant to a
blanket license" from one of two performing rights organizations:
the American Society of Composers, Authors & Publishers (AS-
CAP) or Broadcast Music, Inc. (BMI).5 A blanket license autho-
rizes the licensee to perform any of the copyrighted musical com-
positions in the licensor's repertory during a specific period of
time, usually one year. The performing rights organization charges
a license fee based on station revenues." Since virtually every do-
mestic composition is in the repertory of either ASCAP or BMI,
blanket licenses from both organizations assure the broadcaster's
ability to perform any program.
Each local broadcaster is responsible for acquiring the license
to perform the copyrighted music in the syndicated programs it
broadcasts, even though all other rights are conveyed by the pro-
gram producer or syndicator in its license agreement with the
broadcaster.8 In short, after acquiring the rights to a syndicated
television program from the program producer or syndicator, the
local broadcaster cannot broadcast the program until it has ac-
quired the music performing rights as well. The local station may
acquire music performing rights directly from the composer, from
the program producer, or from a performing rights organization.
The established industry practice, however, is to purchase music
performing rights from a performing rights organization.
In 1985, local broadcasters, acting through the All-Industry
17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982) (emphasis added).
4. See infra notes 39-43 and accompanying text.
5. A third performing rights organization, SESAC, Inc. (SESAC), licenses a small, but
significant, catalog of music copyrights. SESAC originally was known as the Society of Euro-
pean Stage Authors and Composers. Although licenses typically are obtained through one of
the three performing rights organizations, they can be obtained in other ways. For example,
the broadcaster may negotiate directly with the composer or the music publisher for per-
formance rights.
6. The blanket license also is used in other settings-e.g., restaurants, nightclubs, and
department stores-where a flat fee is charged, based on criteria such as square footage,
number of speakers, or seating capacity.
7. See infra note 14.
8. Rights conveyed to the local station with the license include the right to broadcast
other copyrighted elements of the work, including any underlying literary work, screenplay,
and graphic designs used in the work, as well as the right to broadcast the actors' portrayals
of characters or themselves in the program. Failure to acquire any of these rights would
render the local stations unable to broadcast the program.
19891
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TV Music Committee," backed legislation that would outlaw the
blanket license. Local broadcasters believe that the blanket license,
which was valuable during the era when television was "live" and
music selections unpredictable, is now outdated and unfair because
the vast majority of programs are pre-recorded, making it possible
to predict with certainty the compositions to be licensed. Further,
broadcasters see the blanket license as an obstacle to free market
competition in music performing rights because all music perform-
ances are credited at the same rate; in effect, there is no price com-
petition between individual compositions. The broadcasters argue
that composers, publishers, and performing rights organizations
are unwilling to bargain in good faith for performing rights licenses
covering individual compositions while the blanket license exists.
The source licensing bills required program producers to ac-
quire the music performing rights for music contained in their pro-
grams from the composers. The program producers then would be
required to convey these rights to the local broadcasters along with
the license to broadcast the program. Legislatively mandated
source licensing would end blanket licensing of music performing
rights for syndicated television programs and would force a consol-
idation of the music performing right and the right to synchronize
the music and video images,'0 which currently are conveyed
separately."
Proponents of the bills insisted that composers-like others
creatively involved in the programs, including actors, scriptwriters,
and directors-should receive compensation through marketplace
negotiations with program producers. Arguing that it is irrational
to separate out composers' performing royalties for special, sepa-
9. The All-Industry TV Music Committee negotiates license agreements with the per-
forming rights organizations on behalf of local broadcasters. Similarly, licenses for local ra-
dio broadcasters are negotiated by the All-Industry Radio Music Licensing Committee.
10. Synchronization or "synch" rights authorize the synchronization of copyrighted
music with the visual images comprising a program. "Synch" rights are conveyed to the
program producer by the copyright owner (the composer, publisher, or both). Although not
specifically referenced in the Copyright Act, the synchronization right is included in the
right of reproduction under 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (1982). Under present practices, the synch
right is conveyed alone, often for a relatively small fee, as a kind of composer's loss leader.
The composer depends on ASCAP or BMI to collect performance royalties based on per-
formance "credits" accruing from actual performances monitored by the performing rights
organizations and attributed to the individual composers by means of complex reporting
systems.
11. Typically, the performing rights conveyance is facilitated by the composer's non-
exclusive transfer to ASCAP or BMI of the right to license performing rights and the subse-
quent acquisition of a blanket license by the broadcaster.
[Vol. 6:1
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rate licensing,12 broadcasters complain that the blanket license
forces them to purchase the rights to music they neither want nor
need in order to acquire the relatively small number of performing
rights licenses that they do need. They insist that under the blan-
ket license regime, efforts to deal directly with composers, or to
acquire source-licensed programs, inevitably will fail. In their view,
as long as the blanket license is permitted to exist, it will dominate
the marketplace because composers, publishers, and program pro-
ducers (whose interests are closely aligned with the publish-
ers'-often they are the publishers) lack incentives to bargain seri-
ously for alternative forms of licensing.
Opponents of source licensing legislation argue that, by requir-
ing the conveyance of one exclusive right (performance) with an-
other exclusive right (synchronization), mandated source licensing
diminishes the value of copyrights in musical compositions vitiat-
ing an important principle of copyright law: the divisibility of the
separable property rights comprising a copyright. 3 By requiring
conveyance of the performing right with the synchronization right,
mandated source licensing would eliminate the separate market for
performing rights.
Opponents of source licensing legislation argue that without a
bargaining agent such as ASCAP or BMI, composers lack the bar-
gaining strength to negotiate fair compensation for their perform-
ing rights. 14 They claim that forcing the conveyance of performing
12. All-Industry Television Music Committee, TV Music: The Case For Copyright Re-
form (n.d.) (copy on file with the University of Miami Entertainment & Sports Law
Review).
13. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 47, 61 (1976).
The five fundamental rights that the [Act] gives to copyright owners-the exclu-
sive rights of reproduction [synchronization is a variety of reproduction], adap-
tation, publication, performance, and display-are stated generally in [17
U.S.C.] section 106. These exclusive rights, which comprise the so-called "bundle
of rights" that is a copyright, are cumulative and may overlap in some cases.
Each of the five enumerated rights may be subdivided indefinitely and.., each
subdivision of an exclusive right may be owned and enforced separately.
Id. (emphasis added).
14. ASCAP and BMI operate as clearinghouses for the vast majority of non-dramatic
performance rights granted in the United States. "As a practical matter virtually every do-
mestic copyrighted composition is in the repertory of either ASCAP, which has over three
million compositions in its pool, or BMI, which has over one million. ... Almost all broad-
casters hold blanket licenses from both ASCAP and BMI." CBS v. ASCAP, 400 F. Supp.
737, 742 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), rev'd, 562 F.2d 130 (2d Cir. 1977), rev'd sub nom. Broadcast Mu-
sic, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1 (1978). A third performing rights society, Society of European
Stage Authors and Composers (SESAC), licenses the smallest percentage of rights, and has
not figured prominently in the litigation over blanket licensing. Whereas ASCAP and BMI
combined represent over 65,000 composers, SESAC represents only 1,680. Nevertheless,
"SESAC, like ASCAP and BMI, licenses virtually the entire broadcasting industry." See
1989]
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rights simultaneously with synchronization rights would compel
composers to bargain away their performing rights "up front." By
shifting the responsibility for payment from broadcasters to pro-
gram producers, composers thus are forced prematurely to accept a
buy-out for the use of their music before its value in the market-
place is determined. Only established "top name" composers would
be able to command sizable up-front payments; lesser-known com-
posers would be unable to bargain effectively for the speculative
value of their performing rights.
This Article analyzes the arguments on both sides of this de-
bate, beginning in Part II with a retrospective look at the develop-
ment of the performing right under United States copyright law
and the important role performing rights organizations 5 played in
giving effect to the non-dramatic music performing right.16 Part II
examines the utility of the blanket license conveyance of perform-
ing rights in music, with specific emphasis on its use in the televi-
sion industry. Part III discusses antitrust challenges to the blanket
license regime, particularly the pivotal CBS 7 and Buffalo Broad-
casting18 decisions. Part IV identifies and discusses the source li-
censing bills and the principal arguments that have been advanced
for and against that legislation. Finally, this Article concludes that
blanket licensing does not foreclose other licensing methods, in-
cluding source licensing, but, instead, offers a practical compromise
of copyright and antitrust concerns; in contrast, the Article also
concludes that mandated source licensing diminishes the value of
copyrights in musical compositions by eliminating the copyright
owner's ability to separately convey synchronization and perform-
ing rights. This diminution in copyright value that is likely to re-
sult from mandated source licensing would reduce the incentive for
the creation of new music because the performing right, as a sepa-
rate property right licensed under a blanket license, is often the
largest source of income to the composer. If the blanket license-a
form of license that assures continuing payment for continuing
use-is eliminated, composers no longer could expect to share au-
tomatically in the financial success of syndicated programs featur-
generally S. SHEMEL & M. KRASmOVSKY, THIS BUSINESS OF Music 183-86 (5th ed. 1985).
15. In general, references in this Article to ASCAP should be read to include the other
performing rights organizations, BMI and SESAC.
16. See infra note 24 (defining "non-dramatic" performing right).
17. CBS v. ASCAP, 400 F. Supp. 737 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), rev'd, 562 F.2d 130 (2d Cir.
1977), rev'd sub nor. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1 (1978).
18. Buffalo Broadcasting Co. v. ASCAP, 546 F. Supp. 274, 277 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), rev'd,
744 F.2d 917 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1181 (1985).
[Vol. 6:1
6
University of Miami Entertainment & Sports Law Review, Vol. 6, Iss. 1 [1989], Art. 2
http://repository.law.miami.edu/umeslr/vol6/iss1/2
SOURCE LICENSING THREAT
ing their music.
II. PERFORMING RIGHTS IN Music
A. Historical Development
The first Copyright Act,19 enacted in 1790, did not protect mu-
sical compositions. Copyright protection of musical works was not
granted until 183720 and, even then, it was only applied to printed
copies of the work; protection was not extended to performances of
musical compositions. During the latter half of the nineteenth cen-
tury, musical productions for the stage became increasingly popu-
lar.2' Despite this increase in the commercial value of musical
works, composers had no recourse against unauthorized perform-
ances until 1897 when performing rights in musical compositions
were accorded protection under the revised Copyright Act. 2
After recognition in 1897, the performing right immediately
became valuable to composers in licensing "dramatic" perform-
ances2" which were widely publicized and, therefore, easy to moni-
tor; however, "non-dramatic" performances2 4 remained unlicensed
because of the inherent difficulties in determining the extent and
value of such uses. There was "no market mechanism to bring cre-
ators and users together. '25 At the turn of the century, the only
source of income for non-dramatic musical compositions was the
19. Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124, § 1 (creating protection for books, maps,
and charts).
20. Act of February 3, 1831, ch. 16, 4 Stat. 436, § 1.
21. Korman & Koenigsburg, Performing Rights in Music and Performing Rights Soci-
eties, 33 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 332, 336 (1986).
22. Act of Jan. 6, 1897, ch. 4, 29 Stat. 481 (recognizing performance rights in musical
compositions). Subsequently, both the 1909 and 1976 Copyright Acts provided for perform-
ing rights. See infra note 30.
23. "Dramatic performance" rights are often termed "grand rights" and are not li-
censed under the ASCAP blanket license discussed herein. See generally S. SHEMEL & M.
KRAsiLOVsKY, supra note 14, at 198-201; CBS v. ASCAP, 562 F.2d 130 (2d Cir. 1977), rev'd
sub nom. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1 (1978). "For our purposes it is enough to
note that while ASCAP normally could license the performance of a song from, for example,
My Fair Lady, it could not license the song in the context of a performance in whole or part
of the play itself." CBS, 562 F.2d at 132.
24. As long as the musical composition is not performed as an integral part of a dra-
matic work-e.g., an opera, operetta, musical comedy, or play-it may be categorized as a
"non-dramatic performance." Non-dramatic performances occur when a musical composi-
tion is played on the radio, television, or jukebox. Similarly, non-dramatic performances
occur if the performance is in a nightclub by a band. Throughout this article, the phrase
"performing rights" refers to non-dramatic performing rights. ASCAP and BMI license only
non-dramatic rights through blanket licenses. Music users requiring dramatic rights must
negotiate directly with the composer or publisher who owns the copyrighted work.
25. Korman & Koenigsberg, supra note 21, at 337.
1989]
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sale of sheet music; the customary practice was to convey the per-
forming right with the sale of the song sheet.26 During the early
part of the twentieth century, new technologies such as radio, the
phonograph, and the jukebox spawned a significant increase in
non-dramatic music performances and the concomitant ability to
monitor such performances, primarily because larger individual
music users, such as radio broadcasters, emerged. Today, the per-
forming right is the largest source of revenue for the owners of
copyrights in musical works,2 and broadcast media provide the
main source of performing rights revenue.
B. The Development of U.S. Performing Rights
Organizations
The American Society of Composers, Authors & Publishers
(ASCAP) was the first performing rights organization in the
United States; today it remains as the largest.2s ASCAP was organ-
ized in 1914 by composer Victor Herbert and a small group of
prominent composers whose goal was to give meaning to the per-
forming right with respect to non-dramatic performances by licens-
ing and policing uses of ASCAP members' music. Since its incep-
tion, ASCAP has brought copyright infringement suits against
unauthorized users on behalf of its composer members. The first
copyright infringement suit was initiated in 1914 by ASCAP
founder Victor Herbert who prevailed against a restaurant where a
band was playing one of his compositions without authorization.29
A series of early court battles helped to clarify the "performance
for profit" requirement under the 1909 Act.30 Even though ASCAP
prevailed in its early litigation, it was not until 1921, seven years
26. Korman, Performance Rights in Music Under Section 110 and 118 of the 1976
Copyright Act, 22 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 521, 523 (1977), cited in Korman & Koenigsberg,
supra note 21, at 337.
27. Korman & Koenigsburg, supra note 21, at 337.
28. Id.
29. Herbert v. Shanley Co., 222 F. 344 (S.D.N.Y. 1915), aff'd, 229 F. 340 (2d Cir. 1916).
30. See, e.g., Herbert, 222 F. 344 (construing 17 U.S.C. § 1(e) (1909)). To establish a
prima facie case of infringement of a performing right, the 1909 Act required that the al-
leged infringement be a "public performance for profit." The "for profit" requirement, al-
though broadly construed by the courts, was ignored by Congress in the 1976 Copyright Act,
17 U.S.C. §§ 101-914 (1982 & Supp. V 1987), which accords rights in all public performances
to copyright owners. Specific exceptions appear in § 110(1) ("performance... of a work by
instructors or pupils in the course of face-to-face teaching activities of a nonprofit educa-
tional institution .... "), § 110(2) (classroom instruction or transmission related to govern-
mental body or nonprofit educational institution), § 110(3) (religious works performed dur-
ing the course of religious services), and § 110(4) (performances in connection with certain
nonprofit, charitable, fundraising activities).
[Vol. 6:1
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after its formation, that ASCAP's receipts exceeded its costs, thus
enabling a distribution of royalties to its members."
Radio broadcasters always have relied heavily on musical pro-
gramming to attract audiences and advertisers.32 The growing pop-
ularity of radio, phonographs, and motion pictures during the early
1900's contributed to the demise of the parlor piano as the center
of family entertainment, thus creating a decline in sheet music
sales.3 Sheet music, formerly the main source of income for song-
writers, began to lose its economic importance, but the performing
royalties from radio programming and movie theatres started to
replace this lost income, eventually supplanting and exceeding it. 4
As the broadcast industry grew, ASCAP exacted higher fees
for blanket licenses. By the end of the 1930s, broadcasters had be-
come increasingly hostile toward ASCAP, finally boycotting AS-
CAP music3 5 and forming a new performing rights organization to
compete with ASCAP. Thus, in 1939, the broadcasters, responding
to ASCAP's hegemony in the performing rights area, formed
Broadcast Music, Inc. (BMI), a non-profit organization, to increase
the broadcasters' bargaining power in negotiating performing
rights licenses. 6
Although BMI and ASCAP are organized somewhat differ-
ently, both represent the overwhelming majority of composers and
publishers in the licensing of performing rights and today are the
two titans of performing rights licensing.3 7 Each organization em-
ploys its own complex system of monitoring and "weighing" of va-
rious performance criteria to arrive at a schedule of royalty distri-
31. Korman & Koenigsberg, supra note 21. See generally Sobel, The Music Business
and the Sherman Act: An Analysis of the Economic Realities of Blanket Licensing, 3 Loy.
ENT. L.J. 1, 3 (1983).
32. Korman & Koenigsberg, supra note 21, at 337.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 351. "This period is known as the era of 'I Dream of Jeannie with the Light
Brown Hair' by broadcasters and ASCAP alike [because broadcasters used predominately
public domain music in their programs]. By late 1941, a peace of sorts had been restored
between ASCAP and the broadcasters, with new license arrangements worked out." -Id. at
351 n.87.
36. Music Licensing Reform: Hearings On H.R. 3521 Before the Subcomm. on Courts,
Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
99th Cong., 2d Sess. 49 (March 19, 1986) (statement of Ralph Oman, Register of Copyrights)
[hereinafter Statement of Ralph Oman]; CBS v. ASCAP, 400 F. Supp. 737, 742 (S.D.N.Y
1975), rev'd, 562 F.2d 130 (2d Cir. 1977), rev'd sub nom. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441
U.S. 1 (1978).
37. BMI's revenues in 1984 were $136 million. Korman & Koenigsberg, supra note 21,
at 351. ASCAP's revenues for 1987 were about $253 million. Daniels, 1986 A Sweet Year For
ASCAP, DAILY VARTY, Feb. 19, 1987, at 1.
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butions. Both organizations monitor television and radio
broadcasts to detect unlicensed uses, and each has developed so-
phisticated formulae to distribute income to its affiliated compos-
ers and publishers."8
C. The Blanket License
Convenience is the key to the blanket license. 9 A blanket li-
censee acquires rights to perform an extensive repertory of copy-
righted music without having to acquire an individual license for
each particular use. For certain music users, such as nightclubs
and restaurants, a blanket license is virtually imperative. It is prac-
tically impossible for such users to predict their musical require-
ments far enough in advance to procure all the individual licenses
needed to present variety entertainment. Transaction costs would
be astronomical if such users were compelled to track down copy-
right owners (in some cases, heirs of owners) and separately negoti-
ate performing rights licenses for each individual composition that
might be performed in their establishments. Similarly, radio
broadcasters are served well by blanket licensing. Because any mu-
sic selected is covered automatically under the blanket licenses,
broadcasters can program current records without the delays that
would result from locating individual copyright owners and negoti-
ating performing rights licenses.40 Thus, the blanket license
reduces transaction costs by efficiently licensing in one transaction
the performing rights to a vast repertory of music. As noted by
Judge Lasker:
As a practical matter, virtually every domestic composition
is in the repertory of either ASCAP, which has over three mil-
lion compositions in its pool, or BMI, which has over one mil-
lion. Like ASCAP, BMI offers blanket licenses to broadcasters
for unlimited use of the music owned by its "affiliates." Almost
all broadcasters hold blanket licenses from both ASCAP and
BMI.41
38. Although each organization strives for fairness to its members, the different statis-
tical methods employed make disparity inevitable. For example, on one occasion a writer
and publisher of a work received $21,800 as compared to $56,200 received by the co-writer
and his publisher for the same quarter's earnings on the same song. Granville, The Way To
Go: Blanket or Direct, BILLBOARD, May 25, 1985, at 10. While it is possible for a composition
to be "split" according to the performing rights organization affiliation of each individual
co-writer, once a writer makes the choice, all of that writer's compositions are represented
by the performing organization selected for the term of the agreement.
39. CBS v. ASCAP, 400 F. Supp. at 742.
40. Id. at 742.
41. Id.
[Vol. 6:1
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The Supreme Court described the competitive advantages of
the blanket license:
[The] substantial lowering of costs, which is of course poten-
tially beneficial to both sellers and buyers, differentiates the
blanket license from individual use licenses. The blanket license
is composed of the individual compositions plus the aggregating
service. Here, the whole is truly greater than the sum of its
parts; it is, to some extent, a different product. The blanket li-
cense has certain unique characteristics: It allows the licensee
immediate use of covered compositions, without the delay of
prior individual negotiations, and great flexibility in choice of
musical material.4
The inherent efficiencies of the blanket license allow ASCAP to
bargain effectively for its members. For the composer, ASCAP per-
forms a valuable union-like function by serving as a bargaining
agent in negotiations with major buyers of music.4"
ASCAP monitors all media to detect infringements. When it
discovers infringements, ASCAP institutes infringement actions
without cost to the affected composers." Through its reciprocal
agreements with foreign performing rights organizations, ASCAP
collects performance royalties for its members from overseas per-
formances. In turn, a portion of the fees paid by domestic licensees
is distributed to foreign performing rights organizations for distri-
bution to their composer and publisher affiliates.45 A delicate bal-
ance of reciprocal protections and practices has developed interna-
tionally and ASCAP performs an important role in assuring that
American composers are fairly compensated for performances of
their works worldwide.
D. The Blanket License and the Local Television
Broadcaster
Local television broadcasters must acquire licenses for the per-
forming rights to the music contained in the television programs
they broadcast.46 The local broadcaster pays a percentage of its
42. BMI v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1978).
43. ASCAP is not a union; in fact, composers have not been represented by a union in
the film or television industries since 1972. See infra note 108.
44. The litigation costs are paid from the administration fees charged by ASCAP. In
1986, administration fees totalled $47,737,000-equivalent to 18.9% of total receipts. Dan-
iels, supra note 37, at 1.
45. See generally P. DRANOV, INSIDE THE MUSIC PUBLISHING INDUSTRY 124-26 (1980).
46. Performing rights must be obtained for all non-network programming-viz., syndi-
cated programming and locally produced programs. Network programming is covered by
1989]
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revenue for blanket licenses from ASCAP and BMI.47 Revenue at-
tributed to network programming is excluded from the broadcast-
ers' revenue base for purposes of calculating the fee for the blanket
licenses.48
As a result of antitrust litigation against it, ASCAP also makes
available to local broadcasters a second type of license: the per-
program license. The consent decree entered in the litigation49 re-
quires the availability of this "realistic alternative" to the blanket
license.50 A per-program license is a "mini-blanket" license; like
the blanket license, it covers all the compositions in ASCAP's rep-
ertory.5 The essential difference is that the per-program license
applies the blanket license to a particular program, not to all the
broadcaster's non-network programming. The per-program license
fee is calculated based on the revenues attributable to the particu-
lar programs licensed, but is considerably higher as a percentage of
those revenues than the percentage of overall station revenues
charged for an overall blanket license. This higher revenue-to-li-
blanket licenses obtained by the networks from ASCAP and BMI. CBS v. ASCAP, 400 F.
Supp. 737 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), rev'd, 562 F.2d 130 (2d Cir. 1977), rev'd sub nom. Broadcast
Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1 (1978).
47. Broadcasters obtain blanket licenses from both performing rights organizations to
ensure their ability to broadcast virtually all copyrighted music.
48. Buffalo Broadcasting Co. v. ASCAP, 546 F. Supp. 274, 282 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), rev'd,
744 F.2d 917 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1181 (1985). One criticism of this license
is that the provisions that carve out exceptions for network programming do not extend to
syndicated programs "licensed at the source." The exclusion pertains only where the license
at the source was obtained from ASCAP or BMI, as in network programming. For a propo-
sal to amend the consent decrees governing ASCAP and BMI to allow just such a carve-out
provision, see Comment, supra note 1, at 767.
49.
Since 1941, ASCAP and BMI have been governed by consent decrees entered in
proceedings initiated by the Department of Justice under the Sherman Antitrust
Act. Under the decree, ASCAP is enjoined from restraining trade by acquiring
an exclusive performance right from its members. Prior to the decree, ASCAP
held an exclusive performance right to the compositions in its repertory so that
potential music users could not obtain a direct license from the original copy-
right owner. This practice forced music users to acquire a blanket license on
ASCAP's terms. Today the nonexclusive nature of the performance right held by
ASCAP gives a licensee the choice of obtaining the right from ASCAP or the
original composer.
Comment, supra note 1, at 745-46. For a discussion of the original consent decree, see infra
notes 68-74 and accompanying text. The 1941 consent decree was amended in 1950. See
infra notes 75-78 and accompanying text.
50. The consent decree that regulates BMI does not require the availability of such an
alternative. Comment, supra note 1, at 746 & n.65.
51. This is not to be confused with a "per-use" license, which is not offered by ASCAP
or BMI, and has been the subject of litigation. See, e.g., CBS v. ASCAP, 400 F. Supp. 737
(S.D.N.Y. 1975), rev'd, 562 F.2d 130 (2d Cir. 1977), rev'd sub nor. Broadcast Music, Inc. v.
CBS, 441 U.S. 1 (1978).
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cense fee ratio is justified by the added administrative costs AS-
CAP incurs in monitoring individual programs.2 Broadcasters dis-
like the per-program license because they perceive it as too costly
and its reporting requirements as onerous." Nevertheless, in the
landmark decision Buffalo Broadcasting Co. v. ASCAP54 the Sec-
ond Circuit concluded that the per-program license is a realistic
alternative to the blanket license. 5
The blanket license has proven an efficient way to license mu-
sic "in bulk. ' 56 The Supreme Court, rejecting a lower court ruling
that the blanket license restrained trade in licensing performing
rights to networks, described the blanket license as a unique prod-
uct, and more than merely the "sum of its parts. 57 Television
broadcasters, however, do not view the blanket license as a conve-
nience; instead, they view it as an anachronism, burdening their
operations.
III. ANTITRUST CHALLENGES TO THE BLANKET LICENSE
A. Background
Buffalo Broadcasting Co. v. ASCAP58 is the most recent in a
series of antitrust challenges to the blanket license. In Buffalo
Broadcasting local broadcasters argued that the blanket license re-
strains trade by "splitting... the licensing of television performing
rights from the licensing of all other music rights at the source,"5 "
thus eliminating price competition between individual musical
compositions.
The district court, agreeing with the broadcasters, applied the
"rule of reason" analysis and determined that no realistic alterna-
tives to the blanket license existed. On appeal, the Second Circuit
accepted the district court's factual findings, but rejected its legal
52. The blanket license involves little policing since all music performed is licensed
automatically and, as such, non-infringing.
53. Even though stations have demonstrated their disaffection for the per-program li-
cense, it has been upheld consistently as a "realistic alternative" to the blanket license. See,
e.g., Buffalo Broadcasting Co. v. ASCAP, 744 F.2d 917, 926 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105
S. Ct. 1181 (1985).
54. 744 F.2d 917 (2d Cir. 1984).
55. Id. at 926. The court reasoned that the higher per-program rate is justified since it
is charged directly from the revenue base of specific programs at a rate negotiated by the All
Industry Committee and subject to judicial review under the Consent Decree. Id. at 926-27.
56. See generally Korman & Koenigsberg, supra note 21, at 358.
57. BMI v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1978).
58. 546 F. Supp. 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), rev'd, 744 F.2d 917 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
105 S. Ct. 1181 (1985).
59. Buffalo Broadcasting, 546 F. Supp. at 285.
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conclusions, finding instead that realistic alternatives to the blan-
ket license did exist.60
The Buffalo Broadcasting litigation was the impetus for the
recent spate of source licensing legislation. Source licensing legisla-
tion is the All-Industry TV Music Committee's attempt to achieve
through legislation what it could not achieve in the courts. The
antitrust arguments that failed in Buffalo Broadcasting have re-
surfaced as policy and fairness arguments in support of source li-
censing legislation.
While an understanding of Buffalo Broadcasting is integral in
the analysis of the source licensing debate, this case was not a
novel challenge to ASCAP and the blanket license. From the be-
ginning, both ASCAP and the blanket license have encountered
antitrust challenges.6 "
Even at birth . . . ASCAP was seen to possess the organs of a
"combination." It offered, after all, a bulk license-in a single
package, the licensee obtained the right to give non-dramatic
public performances of all works in the ASCAP repertory,
thereby avoiding the need for individual negotiation and licens-
ing with individual copyright owners.2
Antitrust challenges have come from the federal government, 3
state legislatures, 4 and, most notably, in private antitrust actions
brought by music buyers.6 5 The basis of the challenges has been
alleged restraint of trade by composers and publishers. ASCAP has
been characterized by plaintiffs as a "combination" of composers
and publishers, refusing to sell performing rights licenses for indi-
vidual compositions without conveying the blanket rights to all
compositions in the ASCAP repertory.
Since 1941, the performing rights organizations have operated
pursuant to consent decrees entered into in settlement of antitrust
litigation.6 6 One early decision, adverse to ASCAP, ordered source
60. Buffalo Broadcasting, 744 F.2d 917.
61. Rifkind, Music Copyrights and Antitrust: A Turbulent Courtship, 4 CARDOZO
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 2 (1985).
62. Id.
63. The Department of Justice filed an antitrust suit in 1934 alleging ASCAP's domi-
nation of the radio industry. The suit was never tried, in part because, in 1935, ASCAP and
the All-Industry Radio Committee negotiated a compromise in the form of a five-year li-
censing agreement. Sobel, supra note 31, at 5.
64. Various states passed laws hostile to ASCAP's blanket licensing, none of which
remain in force today. Rifkind, supra note 61, at 11-12.
65. Id. at 12-16.
66. United States v. BMI, 1040-43 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 56,096 (E.D. Wis. 1941);
United States v. ASCAP, 1040-43 Trade Cas. (CCH) T 56,104 (S.D.N.Y. 1941). See generally
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licensing of music performing rights to movie theatre operators.",
It is this decision which has spurred broadcasters to seek a similar
judicial mandate in the licensing of music performing rights for
syndicated television programs.
B. Movie Theatres
The industry practice of "splitting" the performing right and
the synchronization right has its roots in the early pre-sound days
of motion pictures. In those days, movie theatre owners employed
musicians-pianists, organists, and sometimes bands or orches-
tras-to accompany the silent films they exhibited. ASCAP issued
annual blanket licenses to movie theatres based on the number of
seats in each theatre, thereby authorizing each theatre's musicians
to perform any music in the ASCAP repertory.
In 1928, as Al Jolsen's "The Jazz Singer" ushered in the era of
sound motion pictures, live musicians quickly were displaced by
the movie soundtrack. Film producers insisted that since theatre
owners "performed" the films, it was appropriate for the theatre
owners to continue to acquire performing rights licenses to the mu-
sic contained in the soundtracks.
The producers had taken on a number of new expenses in pro-
viding music with movies; specifically, they had to pay musicians,
arrangers, and conductors' fees, as well as for the right to
reproduce the composer's copyrighted composition in the film
soundtrack-i.e., the right to synchronize the musical composition
with the film. This synchronization right was acquired by the film
producers in a one-time transaction with the copyright owner at
the time the music was recorded onto the soundtrack. Because it
was the producer who reproduced the work and the theatre owner
who performed it, each was paying for the right it needed.
In Alden-Rochelle, Inc. v. ASCAP,6 8 motion picture theatre
owners alleged that this practice of splitting violated federal anti-
trust laws; the district court agreed. The court held that the com-
poser members of ASCAP violated section one of the Sherman Act,
which prohibits restraint of trade, when they combined to convey
Statement of Ralph Oman, supra note 36.
67. Alden-Rochelle, Inc. v. ASCAP, 80 F. Supp. 888, 891 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
68. Id. In 1947, ASCAP proposed an increase in the blanket license fees for theatres
that would have resulted in price hikes of from 260-1500%. The theatre owners organized
the Theatre Owners of America and managed to negotiate a blanket license agreement for
1948 that raised license fees by only 25-30%. Nevertheless, the theatre owners were angry
and "re.kindled a long-dormant antitrust suit that had been filed against [ASCAP]." That
case was Alden-Rochelle. Sobel, supra note 31, at 12-13.
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to ASCAP, via exclusive licenses, their nondramatic performing
rights. 9 The court ordered that performing rights in music for mo-
tion pictures and theatrical exhibition must be conveyed with the
synchronization rights. This meant that theatre owners no longer
needed to acquire licenses from ASCAP, since their movies arrived
with all exhibition rights-including music performing rights-
cleared at the source, or "source licensed."
Even though motion picture theatres are no longer licensed by
the performing rights organizations, the practice of splitting the
reproduction (synchronization) right and the performing right re-
mains firmly entrenched in entertainment industry practice and
copyright law. Movie theatres are the only commercial establish-
ments"e in the United States in which music is publicly performed
without payment to performing rights organizations."
C. Television
From the earliest days of commercial television in the 1940s,
broadcasters have acquired blanket licenses from the performing
rights organizations to perform publicly the copyrighted music
contained in their programming. From 1941 until 1948, the ASCAP
licenses were given gratuitously to the fledgling television indus-
try. 2 From 1948 until 1950, blanket licenses were granted pursuant
to the terms of the 1941 consent decree. Negotiations for the an-
nual license fees were conducted on behalf of the entire television
industry by the networks. In 1949 the networks proposed that the
Alden-Rochelle doctrine-mandating source licensing for motion
pictures shown in theatres 3-- should apply when motion pictures
were broadcast on television; in essence, the broadcasters wanted
to receive motion pictures with the music performing rights cleared
at the source. ASCAP refused to concede the issue, and the 1949
blanket license agreement between ASCAP and the television in-
69. Alden-Rochelle, Inc. at 894. The Sherman Act is codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7
(1988).
70. The Copyright Act provides exemptions from the exclusive right to perform non-
dramatic musical works under certain conditions for churches, schools, and other non-profit
enterprises. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 110-111 (1982).
71. Sobel, A Movie and TV Producer's Guide to Acquiring and Earning Income from
Soundtrack Music Part II, 7 ENT. L. REP. 3, 4 (Dec. 1985). The splitting of American com-
posers' works with respect to motion pictures still occurs outside the United States. Euro-
pean theatres obtain performing rights licenses from their local performing rights organiza-
tions, and ASCAP composers receive performance royalties from those foreign performances
when American movies are shown in European theatres. Id.
72. See Statement of Ralph Oman, supra note 36, at 52.
73. See supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
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dustry expressly included performing rights to music contained in
movies broadcast on television, thereby effectively limiting Alden-
Rochelle's source licensing requirement strictly to theatrical per-
forming rights. 4
ASCAP's 1941 consent decree was amended in 1950.71 The is-
sues raised in Alden-Rochelle were addressed in the revised con-
sent decree7 6 which provides that ASCAP may not insist on the
blanket license, but, instead, must offer a realistic alternative in
the form of a per-program license.7 Additionally, the fees ASCAP
charges for the license are subject to ongoing judicial scrutiny for
reasonableness by the United States District Court for the South-
ern District of New York. s It is this 1950 amended consent decree
which today governs relations between local broadcasters and
ASCAP.
1. CBS v. ASCAP
The amended consent decree has been challenged a number of
times, but it always has been upheld.79 The first case to raise anti-
trust objections to the blanket license of television music under the
amended consent decree was brought in 1975.80 The CBS television
network challenged the blanket license as a per se violation8' of
74. Buffalo Broadcasting Co. v. ASCAP, 546 F. Supp. 274, 287-88 (S.D.N.Y. 1982),
rev'd, 744 F.2d 917 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1181 (1985). See generally Sobel,
supra note 31, at 14.
75. United States v. American Soc'y of Authors, Composers & Publishers, 1950-51
Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,595 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
76. Statement of Ralph Oman, supra note 36, at 53.
77. Id.
78. United States v. ASCAP, 1950-51 Trade Cas. (CCH) T 62,595 (S.D.N.Y. 1950). If
the potential licensee and ASCAP are unable to agree on a license fee within 60 days from
the initial application date, the applicant may submit the dispute to the District Court,
which then will set a fee.
79. See United States v. ASCAP, 1971 Trade Cas. (CCH) ff 73,491 (S.D.N.Y. 1970);
United States v. ASCAP, 341 F.2d 1003 (2d Cir. 1965); United States v. ASCAP, 208 F.
Supp. 896 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), aff'd, 331 F.2d 117 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 997 (1964).
80. CBS v. ASCAP, 400 F. Supp. 737 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), rev'd, 562 F.2d 130 (2d Cir.
1977), rev'd sub nom. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
81. In an antitrust action, the initial determination focuses on whether an alleged anti-
trust violation is a violation per se, or is subject to a "rule of reason" determination:
Under the per se analysis, only concerted actions which unreasonably restrict
competitive conditions violate section one [of the Sherman Act]; such actions are
considered blatantly anticompetitive without redeeming quality, and are conclu-
sively unreasonable, so the plaintiffs burden of proof is relatively low. For exam-
ple, both horizontal and vertical price fixing agreements are per se illegal.
Statement of R. Oman, supra note 36 at n.47 (citing W. HOLMES, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
AND ANTI-TRUST LAW § 5-4 (1983)).
The rule of reason analysis, unlike the per se rule, allows a legitimate business
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antitrust law. After negotiations for a new blanket license broke
down, CBS sued ASCAP and its composer members seeking an in-
junction requiring ASCAP to issue per-use licenses.82 If granted, it
would have forced ASCAP to issue single performance licenses at
reasonable fees, subject to judicial review.8 3
The district court concluded that because CBS had the alter-
native of dealing directly with the copyright owners and therefore
was not compelled to accept the blanket license, CBS had not
proven "tying" or price fixing.84 CBS appealed, and the Second
Circuit reversed, holding that the blanket license was price fixing,
and thus illegal per se.8" Even though strict adherence to the per
se rule would have required an injunction, 6 the court declined to
enjoin the blanket license, noting that sometimes "market neces-
sity" requires arrangements which otherwise would be per se viola-
tions.8 7 The court remanded to the district court with special in-
structions that "if on remand a remedy can be fashioned which will
ensure that the blanket license will not affect the price or negotia-
tions for direct licenses, the blanket license need not be prohibited
purpose to outweigh an indirect effect on competition to sustain the legality of a
particular practice. The rule of reason allows a balancing of the following factors
to determine competitive unreasonableness: (1) the nature of the challenged re-
straint-size of the organization and importance of the market issues; (2) com-
petitive effect and magnitude of the injury; (3) purpose of the restraint as a
legitimate business purpose or solely to suppress competition.
Id. at n.61 (citing W. HOLMES, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ANTITRUST LAW §§ 5-25, 5-27
(1983)).
It is possible, however, that price-fixing, usually a per se restraint of trade, can never-
theless be legal under a "market necessity" rationale. See CBS, 562 F.2d at 136-37 ("[P]rice-
fixing is per se illegal except where it is absolutely necessary for the market to function at
all.").
82. CBS, 400 F. Supp. at 741.
83. See generally Cirace, CBS v. ASCAP: An Economic Analysis of a Political Prob-
lem, 47 FORDHAM L. REV. 277, 279 (1978).
84. CBS, 400 F. Supp. at 780-83. The district court believed that CBS had sufficient
market power to cause the Harry Fox Agency (an organization which "clears" synch rights
for motion picture producers) to expand to deal in performing rights, or to provide impetus
for another agency to spring up to handle CBS's demand for performing rights. Id. at 962-
68. Because of CBS's market power-it is the largest user of music in the world-the court
found that if CBS chose to direct-license performing rights, copyright owners would "line up
at their doors." Id.
85. CBS, 562 F.2d at 140.
86. Id. at 140. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940)
(noting that "[ulnder the Sherman Act a combination formed for the purpose and with the
effect of raising, depressing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing the price of a commodity in inter-
state or foreign commerce is illegal per se.").
87. CBS, 562 F.2d at 136-38 (holding that "market necessity" did not apply since di-
rect licensing was shown to exist as a realistic alternative to the blanket license).
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in all circumstances." 88
ASCAP appealed to the Supreme Court, which heard the case
in 1979.9 Reversing the Second Circuit, and holding that the blan-
ket license was not illegal per se, Justice White, writing for the
majority, concluded that "in dealing with performing rights in the
music industry we confront conditions both in copyright law and in
antitrust law which are sui generis."90 Justice White noted that in
the 1976 Copyright Act Congress had provided blanket licensing
for cable television, jukeboxes, and noncommercial broadcasts,
thereby indicating that under some conditions blanket licenses
were economically desirable."' On remand, the Second Circuit af-
firmed the district court's original decision upholding the blanket
license.
2. Buffalo Broadcasting Co. v. ASCAP
In 1982, local television broadcasters invoked antitrust princi-
ples to attack the blanket license. This time, the focus was nar-
rowed to particular types of programming: syndicated television
programs and commercials.2
The background for this case, Buffalo Broadcasting Co. v. AS-
CAP,9 3was the Second Circuit's approval in its 1981 CBS v. AS-
CAP94 opinion of the blanket license under the rule of reason anal-
ysis. In CBS, the court held that the blanket license did not have
the alleged restraining effect on trade because the plaintiffs had
failed to prove a lack of alternatives to the blanket license. Specifi-
cally, the court found that direct licensing of music performing
rights from copyright owners was a realistic alternative to the blan-
ket license, considering CBS's size and bargaining strength in the
market. 5 The broadcasters in Buffalo Broadcasting claimed that
their lack of market strength made it impossible for them to utilize
the direct licensing option that the court in CBS found available to
the network" and that they had no realistic alternative to the
blanket license for acquiring the performing rights to the music
88. Id. at 140.
89. CBS, 441 U.S. 1 (1978).
90. Id. at 10 (quoting CBS v. ASCAP, 562 F.2d 130, 132 (2d Cir. 1977)).
91. Id. at 16.
92. Buffalo Broadcasting Co. v. ASCAP, 546 F. Supp. 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), rev'd 744
F.2d 917 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1181 (1985).
93. Id.
94. CBS v. ASCAP, 620 F.2d 930, 957 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 970 (1981).
95. Id. See also supra note 84 (discussing the market power of CBS).
96. Buffalo Broadcasting, 546 F. Supp. 274.
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contained in syndicated programming.
The district court agreed that no realistic alternatives to the
blanket license were available to the broadcasters." The court then
applied the rule of reason balancing test, evaluating the procompe-
titive versus the anticompetitive effects of the blanket license, and
concluded that the anticompetitive effects outweighed the procom-
petitive effects: the blanket license restrained trade in violation of
federal antitrust laws. 8
On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed, finding that both di-
rect and per-program licensing provided local broadcasters with re-
alistic alternatives to the blanket license.9 9 The court noted that
even though per-program fees were higher, they were not unrea-
sonably higher.100 Moreover, because the fees were subject to judi-
cial review pursuant to the 1950 amended consent decree, adequate
protections against unreasonable fees existed for the broadcaster.
The court explained that only a horizontal agreement among com-
posers to refuse to license through source or direct licenses would
constitute anticompetitive activity, and the broadcasters had not
shown that such an agreement existed. So long as the blanket li-
cense is one of several realistic means by which broadcasters can
acquire licenses for music performing rights, no restraint of trade
is shown by the mere fact of its competitive superiority to the
other available licensing methods. 0 1
IV. SOURCE LICENSING LEGISLATION
A. Background
After defeat in the courts, local broadcasters took their fight to
Congress, convincing some legislators that the Copyright Act
should be amended to mandate source licensing for syndicated
programming. As a result, source licensing legislation was intro-
duced in 1985.102 The legislation met strenuous opposition from
composers, publishers, the U.S. Copyright Office, The Songwriter's
Guild, The Delegation of the Commission of the European Com-
munities, and others. Although source licensing bills initially at-
tracted seventeen co-sponsors in the Senate and 164 in the
97. Id. at 293.
98. Id. at 296.
99. Buffalo Broadcasting, 744 F.2d at 933.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 933-34.
102. See H.R. 3521, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985); S. 1980, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985).
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House,10 3 both bills died in committee.0 4
In 1987, the local broadcasters tried again. The 1987 bills,
H.R. 1195 and S. 698, although amended to address some of the
concerns of the 1985-86 opponents, attracted only seventy-five co-
sponsors in the House and eight in the Senate. 10 5 This diminished
103. American Society of Composers, Authors & Publishers, Update on Source Licens-
ing Bills (n.d.) (copy on file with the University of Miami Entertainment & Sports Law
Review).
104. Id.
105. The bills were identical except for a provision (§g) in the House bill that granted
collective bargaining rights to composers in work-for-hire situations. The provision was
stricken from the Senate version to accommodate conservative interests in "right to work"
states. H.R. 1195 provided:
A BILL
Entitled the "Syndicated Television Music Copyright Reform Act of 1987"
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
States of America in Congress assembled, That this Act may be cited as the
"Syndicated Television Music Copyright Reform Act of 1987."
Sec. 2. Title 17, United States Code, is amended by redesignating sections
113 through 118 as sections 114 through 119, respectively, and by inserting after
section 112 the following new section:
"§ 113. LIMITATIONS ON EXCLUSIVE RIGHTS: USE OF MUSICAL WORKS IN SYNDICATED
TELEVISION PROGRAMS
"(a) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, no owner, assignee, or
licensee of a copyrighted audiovisual work may convey the right to perform pub-
licly such work by non-network commercial television broadcast without simul-
taneously conveying the right to perform in synchronization any copyrighted
music which accompanies such audiovisual work.
"(b) Notwithstanding section 101 of this title, for purposes of this section,
the term 'audiovisual work' means any motion picture, prerecorded television
program, or commercial advertisement.
"(c) Subsection (a) does not apply to works prepared by, for or under the
direction of organizations that are exempt from Federal income tax under sec-
tion 501(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 by reason of section 501(c)(3)
of such Code."
Sec. 3 Section 106 of title 17, United States Code, is amended by striking
out "118" and inserting in lieu thereof "119."
Sec. 4. Section 201 of title 17, United States Code, is amended by adding
the following new subsection:
"(f) Whenever the right to perform by broadcast any motion picture or
other audiovisual work containing a synchronous musical work as provided in
section 113, is conveyed to any commercial broadcast station, the author or au-
thors of such musical work (or in the case of a work made for hire the employer
or employees who prepared the work) shall be entitled to an interest in any com-
pensation paid to the owner of the copyright in such motion picture or other
audiovisual work. The amount of such interests shall be determined by agree-
ment between the owner of the copyright in the motion picture or other audiovi-
sual work and the author(s) or employee(s) who prepared the work.
"(g) In any case in which a musical work, which constitutes a work made
for hire under subsection (b), is synchronized with a motion picture or other
audiovisual work, the person who prepared such work shall be considered an
employee, for purposes of laws relating to collective bargaining, of the owner of
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support is perhaps the result of the extensive education and lobby-
ing efforts by ASCAP, BMI, and other affected organizations to
explain the benefits of blanket licensing. This campaign began im-
mediately upon introduction of the first source licensing bills and
continues today.
The bills before the 100th Congress differed with respect to
one provision which was included in the House bill 0 s but had been
stricken from the Senate version: 10 7 the composers' right to collec-
tively bargain as employees of producers. This amendment was in-
tended to address the concerns of many who feared that without
the performing rights organizations as bargaining agents, many
composers-especially new and unknown composers-would not
have the bargaining power to negotiate effectively for fair
compensation.
Special provision for the right to collectively bargain is neces-
sary because composers today are considered independent contrac-
tors,108 and thus are not recognized as "employees" under the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act. 0 9  If source licensing is made
mandatory, then such a collective bargaining provision is necessary
to enable composers to acquire bargaining strength in their negoti-
the copyright in such motion picture or other audiovisual work."
Sec. 5. The amendments made by this Act shall take effect on the date of
enactment of the Act, except that the amendment made by section 1 shall not
affect a public performance occurring during the one-year period beginning on
the date of enactment of this Act pursuant to a contract executed before such
date of enactment.
H.R. 1195, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) (emphasis added).
106. Id.
107. S. 698, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987). The full text of the House bill appears at
supra note 105.
108. Bernstein v. Universal Pictures, 517 F.2d 976 (2d Cir. 1975). See generally Hav-
licek & Kelso, The Rights of Composers and Lyricists: Before and After Bernstein, 8
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 439 (1984). Originally, composers were unionized and the Composers
and Lyricists Guild of America (CLGA) was the bargaining representative for film/TV in-
dustry composers. The NLRB had recognized the CLGA in 1954 when many composers
were traditional employees of studios. After an unsuccessful strike in 1972, the composers
brought a suit alleging antitrust violations against the Association of Motion Picture and
Television Producers (AMPTP). In order to pursue this cause of action, normally unavaila-
ble when a labor agreement is involved, the composers argued that they were not employees,
but independent contractors. Although the composers won the proverbial battle in that they
were partly successful in their antitrust challenge to AMPTP, they lost the war because the
CLGA was no longer recognized as the bargaining agent for the composers. Subsequent at-
tempts to organize have met with indifference from the AMPTP, which refuses to meet with
any composers' organization, and the NLRB, which agrees that composers today are inde-
pendent contractors and not covered under the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§
152-158 (1982).
109. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1982).
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ations with producers comparable to other creators in the film and
television industry. This issue, used to defeat the 1985 licensing
bills which contained no collective bargaining provisions, was ad-
dressed by amendments to the 1987 bills, expressly guaranteeing
the composers' right to bargain collectively. The Senate co-spon-
sors could not agree on this amendment, however, since Senators
from "right-to-work" states found provisions guaranteeing the
right to unionize inimical to their positions on collective bargain-
ing. As a result, the collective bargaining amendment remained a
part of H.R. 1195, but was deleted from S. 698.
Without the performing rights societies to negotiate licenses
and monitor infringements, independent contractor composers oc-
cupy an inherently weak bargaining position in negotiations with
program producers. Without the right to collectively bargain, com-
posers will not be able to bargain effectively for their performing
rights. Moreover, even with the right to unionize, it could take
years to achieve recognition and develop effective representation.
B. Arguments For and Against Source Licensing Legislation
Proponents of source-licensing, principally broadcasters, have
advanced five arguments in support of legislatively mandated
source licensing and the legislative abolition of blanket licensing.
First, they argue that under blanket licensing, payments for music
are not related to the value of the musical components of the syn-
dicated programming.110 The blanket fee is the same regardless of
whether the programming features musical variety shows or news
documentaries. Second, broadcasters contend that the blanket fee
is charged even if a program uses no music, a patently unfair re-
sult."' Third, broadcasters assert their willingness to pay royalties
to composers, but argue that only 40 cents of every dollar paid
under the blanket license goes to composers. Out of the other 60
cents, 40 cents goes to the publishers and 20 cents to the perform-
ing rights organizations, in the form of administrative fees." 2 The
broadcasters point out that many publishing houses are owned by
the Hollywood studios that produce syndicated programs and
110. See Bostick, Other Side of the Music Coin, BROADCASTING, Aug. 10, 1987, at 22
(Letter to the editor from the President and General Manager of KWTX-TV, Waco, Texas).
111. Id. Although in theory this is true, this author has seen no statistics indicating
that this ever actually happens. In fact, weather, sports, news and other "non-music ori-
ented" programming generally has some musical component-theme music, background
music, or both.
112. Id.
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merely provide an additional source of revenue for producers.
Broadcasters insist that producers who profit from the blanket li-
censing system have no incentive to alter the manner in which per-
forming rights are licensed."'
Fourth, the broadcasters analogize the syndicated television
program market to the motion picture market and insist that
source licensing-ordered by the court for motion pictures in Al-
den-Rochelle in 1948-should be equally applicable to syndicated
television. 11 4 Finally, broadcasters maintain that the blanket li-
cense discourages the use of local composers' works. Because the
blanket license provides access to the total repertory of a perform-
ing rights organization, it is more economical simply to turn to that
repertory for needed music, rather than to a local composer.
Not surprisingly, supporters of the blanket license, most nota-
bly the performing rights societies whose very existence is
threatened by mandated source licensing, 115 argue strenuously
against source licensing legislation. They advance six principal
counterarguments in support of their position.
First, they claim mandated source licensing would force com-
posers to set fees before public performance of the work-i.e.,
before the value of the work in the marketplace is known." 6 Sec-
ond, the huge financial investments and low success rates associ-
ated with television programs produced for syndication militate
against a willingness on the part of producers to shoulder more
"up-front" costs. This is particularly true where the up-front costs
are for speculative performing royalties that may have no value if
the program is not successful. Producers are likely to use less origi-
nal music and more library music or public domain music, rather
than add additional costs to an already huge initial investment.
Third, opponents to source licensing argue that the blanket
license has operated as an incentive for new composers and that
mandated source licensing would remove that incentive, thus sti-
fling the creation of new works. Specifically, the new composer, un-
able to bargain for a large initial payment, often will compose new
113. Id.
114. 133 CONG. REC. S2921 (daily ed. Mar. 10, 1987) (Statement of Sen. Strom
Thurmond).
115. The performing rights societies view any attack on the blanket licensing system
as a threat to their existence. This is understandable in light of the 46-year history of law-
suits challenging the blanket license in other contexts.
116. American Society of Composers, Authors & Publishers, Don't Stop the Music
(1987) (pamphlet outlining several arguments in opposition to S. 698 and H.R. 1195) (copy
on file with the University of Miami Entertainment & Sports Law Review).
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music for a low up-front payment, anticipating greater rewards
from future performing royalties. Source licensing would reduce
composers' incentives to do this because performance royalties
would decrease, or even disappear, without the benefit of an estab-
lished system for monitoring and valuing them. Alternatively, new
composers, hungry to enter the market, may convey valuable rights
for a fraction of their value. Presently, such a composer is en-
couraged to create by the chance of sharing in the success of a pro-
duction in which his or her music is featured, by collecting per-
forming royalties through a performing rights organization."17 The
performing right, as presently administered, offers composers a
"run at the brass ring" by guaranteeing that their sacrifice and ef-
fort will pay off if the program is a success.
Fourth, ASCAP argues that the policy favoring the divisibility
of copyright is vitiated by a system that requires performing rights
to be conveyed with synchronization rights.' Copyright practi-
tioners lobbied long and hard to obtain express recognition of the
divisibility principle in the Copyright Act of 1976. Mandated
source licensing chips away at this important property right. Fifth,
ASCAP argues that currently four licensing options are open to
broadcasters: Source, blanket, per-program, and direct. The man-
dated source license eliminates all choices except source licensing.
Finally, foreign retaliation is predicted if source licensing is man-
dated in this country. At present, domestic composers enjoy
favorable protection and income from foreign performances of
their works; this favorable treatment would be jeopardized if
American broadcasters are enabled to avoid ongoing payments for
performing rights. Opponents of source licensing fear a retaliatory
reaction by foreign broadcasters against American music and a
concomitant loss in income for American composers.
C. Discussion
Both the Second Circuit in Buffalo Broadcasting"9 and the
Supreme Court in CBS 2 0 determined that the blanket license of
music performing rights for syndicated television programming
117. Opponents argue that this system has created incentives for program producers
to use more original music since composers are willing to accept low up front payments and
take a chance, along with the producer, on the success of a show.
118. There are two sources of income from the division of the music copyright with
respect to syndicated television programs. See supra text accompanying note 10.
119. Buffalo Broadcasting Co. v. ASCAP, 744 F.2d 917 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105
S. Ct. 1181 (1985).
120. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1 (1978).
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and network programming constitutes neither a per se restraint of
trade nor an unreasonable restraint of trade under the rule of rea-
son analysis. The courts concluded that the alternatives of source
and direct licensing exist, even as they noted obstacles to their
availability. The facts showed that neither the networks nor the
local broadcasters had made bona fide attempts to license through
either of these alternative means, and therefore were unable to
prove their unavailability. The availability of realistic alternative
licensing means was dispositive in these cases, and the blanket li-
cense survived legal challenge.
The Supreme Court observed that the prevalence of the blan-
ket license is not the result of an unlawful restraint of trade, but is
instead the natural result of the license's superiority as a "prod-
uct." The Court particularly noted that the blanket license has cer-
tain inherent efficiencies which reduce transaction costs for licen-
sees. However, the fact that realistic alternatives exist does not
mean they are easily attainable, or attainable without cost.
Although the history of antitrust litigation involving the blan-
ket license is extensive-the litigation has arisen in different in-
dustries and contexts-it appears that opponents of the blanket
license in the television industry have exhausted their credible
challenges with the CBS and Buffalo Broadcasting decisions.
Many of the arguments put forward by the opponents of blanket
licensing in support of their antitrust theories have resurfaced as
policy and fairness arguments in support of source licensing copy-
right "reform" bills. It seems that the blanket license as applied to
local television broadcasters and syndicated programming is not
susceptible to further antitrust challenges because the Second Cir-
cuit's holding in Buffalo Broadcasting appears dispositive on the
question. Consequently, the broadcasters have taken the fight to
Congress, resting their hopes on source licensing legislation.
At the core of the broadcasters' position is the argument that
local broadcasters ought to be treated the same as movie theatre
owners, who possess the ability to obtain their programming with
all rights licensed at the source. Broadcasters agree that in the
early days of television the blanket license was necessary because
programming was live and thus unpredictable; however, they insist
that today's programming, in contrast, is preset and predictable,
more akin to motion pictures. Broadcasters argue that television
producers should be required to obtain a performing rights license
from the music copyright owners just as motion picture producers
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have been required to do since Alden-Rochelle.121 There are some
notable differences, however, between the problems addressed by
the court in Alden-Rochelle in 1948 and the present realities in
syndicated television programming.
The Alden-Rochelle litigation arose in a different era of the
entertainment industry, before the amended consent decree of
1950 pursuant to which ASCAP now licenses performing rights. In
that earlier era, movie producers, music publishers, and ASCAP
combined to restrict distribution of films to those theatres holding
ASCAP licenses. ASCAP members had to convey exclusive rights
to ASCAP;122 theatre owners could not negotiate directly with
composers. 123 Per-program licensing was not available before Al-
den Rochelle; instead, only blanket licenses were offered. More-
over, theatre owners were unable to bargain effectively with AS-
CAP to set reasonable fees and fees for the blanket licenses were
set unilaterally by ASCAP.
Today, local broadcasters deal with ASCAP through the All-
Industry TV Music Committee which negotiates blanket and per-
program license fees, both of which are subject to review by the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York. ASCAP is forbidden by the amended consent decree to ob-
tain exclusive licenses from composers; consequently, local broad-
casters, unlike the pre-Alden-Rochelle theatre owners, may bar-
gain directly with composers for performing rights.
Beyond these legally significant differences, there are certain
industry practices and practicalities that undermine the usefulness
of comparisons between movie theatres and television broadcast-
ers. For instance, there are far fewer motion pictures than televi-
sion programs produced each year, translating into fewer opportu-
nities for composers in the motion picture industry. Moreover,
motion pictures are produced with larger budgets than television
programs. Larger budgets mean motion picture producers can
withstand more substantial up-front payments when negotiating
for music synchronization and performance rights in one convey-
ance. Where increased payments to composers might discourage
music use in lower budget television productions, motion pictures,
121. Alden Rochelle, Inc. v. ASCAP, 80 F. Supp. 888, 891 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
122. See Comment, supra note 1, at 747.
123. See Alden-Rochelle, Inc., 80 F.Supp at 892. The Alden-Rochelle court noted
that: "Motion picture producers rented their films to the exhibitors (theatre operators) with
a provision in the contract that the film would be exhibited only in a theatre for which
ASCAP had issued a license to perform publicly for profit the musical composition of AS-
CAP's members." Id. The textual assertion is an obvious corollary of this practice.
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because of their huge budgets, have been able to adjust to the
added costs without seriously reducing the use of music in films.
The fees paid to composers for the creation or use of music in
films are much higher than those paid by television producers.
Nevertheless, it is a one-time payment and forces a buy-out-at
least with respect to performances of the composer's music in do-
mestic movie theatres. 24 Other factors, present in the motion pic-
ture industry but not in television, have made source licensing tol-
erable for composers in the film industry, despite the forced buy-
out.
One inducement for composers to create music for motion pic-
tures is the relatively high incidence of soundtrack albums which
are "spun off" from motion pictures. This is an additional opportu-
nity for composers to earn profits from artist's (original perform-
ance) royalties,' 25 mechanical royalties,'26 and performance royal-
ties127 from their completed work. Such soundtrack releases are
much less common with television productions.
Although movie theatres in the United States do not pay per-
formance fees to the performing rights organizations, 2 ' theatres in
Europe do pay such license fees. When American movies are shown
in European theatres, performing royalties are collected by foreign
performing rights societies and returned to the composers through
ASCAP and BMI. Additionally, once a movie has had its U.S. the-
atre run, it generally is packaged for licensing to networks, pay-TV
companies, cable programming services, and syndicated program
packagers. All these users of music (except the syndicators) must
obtain performing rights licenses for the music contained in the
movie soundtracks and, as a result, they all (except the syndica-
124. Foreign movie theatres continue to pay performing royalties to foreign perform-
ing rights societies. See supra note 71.
125. Record companies generally pay soundtrack composers 14-18% of the album's
suggested retail price. Often composers receive large non-refundable advances against royal-
ties from the record companies. Sobel, A Movie and TV Producer's Guide to Acquiring and
Earning Income from Soundtrack Music Part III, 7 ENT. L. RPTm. 3 (Jan. 1986).
126. The composer receives the artist royalty for the performance recorded initially
onto the master recording from which records are made. A second royalty is paid for the
underlying musical compositions embodied in the master recording. Mechanical license fees
are paid for each record manufactured (mechanically reproduced). The rate is set by the
Copyright Royalty Tribunal (CRT), and is about six cents per song per record at present (10
songs = 60 cents per record). Record companies generally negotiate a lower rate, typically
75% of the rate established by the CRT. Id. at 3-4.
127. Music from soundtrack albums receive airplay on radio, television, and in public
facilities such as nightclubs and restaurants. ASCAP and BMI license these establishments,
as well as broadcasters, providing income for the composers. Id.
128. See supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text.
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tors) obtain blanket licenses from ASCAP and BMI.
Motion pictures constitute a significant portion of the syndi-
cated programming that would be subject to source licensing legis-
lation. The assurance of royalties from television performances
constitutes an added incentive for composers in the motion picture
industry. A change in the licensing of music contained in television
programs will affect the film industry by forcing even higher up
front payments for music, in effect compensating for the loss in
performing royalties under blanket licenses from syndicated televi-
sion performances of the motion pictures.
In evaluating the principal arguments advanced by the source
licensing proponents, particular attention must be paid to the ef-
fect of mandated source licensing on existing contracts, as well as
its effect on the rights of copyright owners under section 201(d) of
the Copyright Act.129
D. Retroactivity
Section five of S. 698130 provided a one-year grace period to
producers or syndicators; during this time programs broadcast pur-
suant to contracts executed before the effective date of enactment
of the new law would not be affected by the amendment to section
113(a) of the Copyright Act.' 31 These pre-existing contracts need
not have included music performing rights in the original convey-
ance. However, as most contracts covering program performing
rights run from three to seven years or longer, this is problem-
atic.1"2 A one-year grace period is therefore insufficient to serve as
a transition to a new licensing system. In sum, the abbreviated
transition period has the effect of retroactively impairing the pro-
ducers' contracts.
Ralph Oman, the Register of Copyrights, addressed this issue
on behalf of the Copyright Office in his remarks before the House
129. 17 U.S.C. § 201(d) (1982). Section 201(d) states:
(1) The ownership of a copyright may be transferred in whole or in part by
any means of conveyance or by operation of law, and may be bequeathed by will
or pass as personal property by the applicable laws of intestate succession.
(2) Any of the exclusive rights comprised in a copyright, including any sub-
division of any of the rights specified by section 106, may be transferred as pro-
vided by clause (1) and owned separately. The owner of any particular exclusive
right is entitled, to the extent of that right, to all of the protection and remedies
accorded to the copyright owner by this title.
Id.
130. S. 698, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
131. See supra note 105.
132. Statement of Ralph Oman, supra note 36, at 77.
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Committee on the Judiciary during the 99th Congress.'33 Oman ar-
gued that retroactive legislation must be avoided on principle,
claiming that such legislation would be unfair to producers by re-
quiring them to renegotiate existing agreements with composers to
acquire the performing right.134 Further, Oman expressed his belief
that such legislation is violative of the fifth amendment prohibi-
tion on Congress' passing laws impairing the obligations of con-
tracts. 35 Oman insists that, if source licensing legislation is en-
acted, it should be prospective, affecting only future programs,
movies, and commercials. 38 Prospective legislation could, however,
institute a self-defeating dual system as the blanket license would
survive as the preferred licensing system for pre-existing
programs.'37
E. Copyright Divisibility
Perhaps the most compelling argument against amending the
Copyright Act to mandate source licensing is that such an amend-
ment would undermine the divisibility of copyright principle, thus
diminishing the value of copyrights in musical works. Broadcasters
argue that composers' rights are no different from those of actors
or directors and should be compensable by a similar residual pay-
ments system. Leaving aside the collective bargaining13 differ-
ences, it is clear that the rights of composers are different from
those of other creators because of policies underlying the copyright
laws. Copyrights in musical works are subdividable into separate
property interests, including the rights to reproduce (synchronize)
and to perform (broadcast). "Producers synchronize; broadcasters
perform."' 3 9 Accordingly, each of these users of a subdividable
right in the music copyright pays for the right it uses. Copyright
owners are able to negotiate separately for each exclusive right.
Mandated source licensing would require that two separate,
133. Statement of Ralph Oman, supra note 36.
134. Id. at 77 (citing 2 SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 41.02 (4th ed. 1973)).
135. Id. at 77 (citing 2 SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 41.03 (4th ed. 1973)).
136. Id. at 77.
137. Id.
138. Actors and directors are represented by unions pursuant to collective bargaining
agreements negotiated with talent buyers. Composers are unable to achieve this strength in
the marketplace because, as independent contractors, they cannot be represented by a col-
lective bargaining agent. See supra notes 108-109 and accompanying text. See generally
Havlicek & Kelso supra note 108.
139. American Society of Composers, Authors & Publishers, The Facts Re: Source Li-
censing Legislation (n.d.) (copy on file with the University of Miami Entertainment &
Sports Law Review).
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exclusive property rights be conveyed together, in a single transac-
tion. 40 This would diminish the value of the copyright as a whole
because it would restrain alienation of the performing right except
in the tandem synch/performing right conveyance. The policy of
severability of property interests in copyright figured prominently
in Congress' crafting of the 1976 Copyright Act. The House Report
clearly expresses Congress' concern:
[The Act] contains the first explicit statutory recognition of the
principle of divisibility of copyright in our law. This provision,
which has long been sought by authors and their representa-
tives, and which has attracted wide support from other groups,
means that any of the exclusive rights that go to make up a
copyright, including those enumerated in section 106 and any
subdivision of them, can be transferred and owned separately.
The definition of "transfer of copyright ownership" in section
101 makes clear that the principle of divisibility applies whether
or not the transfer is "limited in time or place of effect," and
another definition in the same section provides that the term
"copyright owner," with respect to any one exclusive right, re-
fers to the owner of that particular right.""
Under the proposed law, there could be no separate market for
the performing right. As with other forms of property, intellectual
property is held and traded freely, subject to private contracts of
many types and the owners' reasonable expectations based upon
copyright law, case law, and industry practices. Undermining copy-
right owners' ability to trade freely with the separate "sticks" in
their bundle of rights would be a "highly negative precedent for all
owners of intellectual property.' 14- The American Intellectual
Property Law Association states:
Government interference with personal property rights deprives
copyright owners of the right to freely use their property. Such
serious action would only be justified, in our view, if the harm to
the public is both clearly demonstrated and grievous. 4 3
Similarly, the Copyright Office believes it would be unwise to
pass drastic legislation affecting the sanctity of contracts and divis-
140. See S. 698, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1987); H.R. 1195, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2
(1987). Proposed § 113 of the Copyright Act would require conveyance of synch and per-
formance rights in one transaction. See supra note 105.
141. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 123 (1976).
142. Letter from Thomas F. Smegel, Jr., President of the American Intellectual Prop-
erty Law Association to Robert W. Kastenmeier, Chairman, Subcommittee on Courts, Civil
Liberties, and the Administration of Justice. (March 18, 1986).
143. Id.
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ibility of copyright when competitive licensing alternatives are ap-
parently available.'4
V. CONCLUSION
Source licensing legislation proposed a major change in the ad-
ministration of music performing rights. If successful, the legisla-
tion would have threatened the complex performing rights admin-
istration system that has evolved over nearly a half century. It
would outlaw the blanket licenses ASCAP, BMI, and SESAC have
offered for forty-five years for television performances of music in
syndicated programming. The legislation does not provide for the
replacement of performing rights organizations with another
agency or organization to assure fair payment for composers'
works, or to prevent infringements. Broadcasters argue that the
administration fees charged by the performing rights societies are
too high. Composers do not complain, however, when ASCAP,
without cost to the affected composer, tracks down infringers and
initiates legal action to prevent the infringing use.
Source licensing legislation would eliminate completely the
blanket license for syndicated television programs. The Buffalo
Broadcasting court has determined that three realistic forms of li-
censing are currently available: Source, direct, and blanket. If
source licensing legislation is passed, two of these options will be
eliminated.
By removing the amendment providing the right to collec-
tively bargain, the Senate condemned composers to a weak bar-
gaining position. The All-Industry TV Music Committee argues
that actors, screenwriters, and others creatively involved in syndi-
cated programs are able to successfully negotiate for and receive
residual payments based on the resale of the programs, and that
this is the appropriate way for composers to be compensated for
the use of their music. It is important to recognize, however, that
these other creators are members of unions or guilds that act as
bargaining agents for them. Composers, conversely, are specifically
prohibited from unionizing.145 The inclusion of the collective bar-
gaining amendment offered some hope that if the blanket license
was outlawed, a collective bargaining representative could emerge
to replace the performing rights organizations. Without such a col-
lective bargaining provision, composers would be required to give
144. See Statement of Ralph Oman, supra note 36.
145. See supra notes 108-109 and accompanying text.
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up their long-established licensing system for a "pig in a poke."' 46
146. Berman, TV Source Licensing: Trading Copyrights For "A Pig in a Poke", BILL-
BOARD, Dec. 20, 1986, at 9.
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